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Introduction
Firms often receive funding from more than one bank. Ongena and Smith (2000) document that on a sample of firms spanning across 20 European countries less than 15% of the firms borrow from a single bank. Although multiple banking seems to be more common among large firms due to its high transactions costs, there is a large evidence documenting reliance on multiple lenders also among small and medium businesses (Detragiache et al. (2000) for Italy; Farinha and Santos (2002) for Portugal and Guiso and Minetti (2010) for US). The question of the advantages of multiple bank relationships relative to a single bank relationship has attracted a lot of interest in the banking literature and several explanations have been put forward.
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This paper contributes to this literature by looking at the impact, if any at all, of the number of bank relationships on the short term performance of initial public offering (IPO) firms as measured by underpricing. IPO firms are an interesting laboratory to investigate this question as they are characterized by a high degree of ex-ante uncertainty and information asymmetry. The monitoring by their relationship banks is very important and, indeed, several papers document that the certification role of lending banks reduces the cost of going public for IPO firms (Slovin and Young, 1990; James and Wier, 1990, Schenone, 2004) . However none of the existing papers investigates whether the benefits of bank lending on IPO performances depend on the number of bank relationships developed prior to the IPO date. 2 The reason why we believe the number of bank relationships could potentially matter for IPO firms is that an extensive literature in banking, but not only, shows that when there are multiple 1 See Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) for a complete survey of the empirical contributions on multiple banking relationships. 2 We are here interested in the credit relationships developed by IPO firms with banks prior to the IPO date. Hence in what follows single bank relationship will refer to an IPO firm which is borrowing from a single bank whereas multiple bank relationships will refer to an IPO firms which is borrowing from more than one bank. principals monitoring an agent in environments characterized by asymmetric information, coordination and free riding problems are likely to arise and adversely affect the level of monitoring (Carletti et al. (2007) , Khalil et al. (2007) ).
3 If this is the case then the certification role of multiple bank relationships for IPO firms might be weakened and, consequently, have a smaller beneficial impact on the IPO performance.
We test this hypothesis on a sample of 381 US IPOs between 1998 and 2008 and find that firms that have multiple banking relationships at the IPO date are fundamentally different from those with a single banking relationship. Specifically, we find that IPO firms with multiple bank relationships are generally larger but not necessarily less profitable contrary to what predicted by Carletti et al. (2007) . More importantly, our results show that IPOs with multiple bank relationships are significantly more underpriced than IPOs with a single bank relationship after controlling for several factors that could explain the difference in the level of underpricing thereby providing convincing support to our main hypothesis. However, we find that the impact on the underpricing is not increasing in the number of banks or in the strength of the relationship. Finally, we investigate whether the effect on underpricing of multiple banking relationships is influenced by whether the firm decides to choose (at least) one of its relationship banks as its IPO underwriter, but, contrary to Schenone (2004) , we do not find any empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Our results suggest that the certification role of multiple bank relationships is perceived by the market as weaker than that of a single bank relationship, thereby supporting the view that multiple banks might be less effective at monitoring their companies.
3 Similarly, in the venture capital literature a couple of recent papers (Chahine et al.(2012) , Falconieri et al. (2013) ) empirically document that IPO firms that are backed by VC syndicates tend to exhibit poorer short and long term IPO performance. The result are interpreted as the consequence of internal agency conflicts in VC syndicates which ultimately lead to poor monitoring and hence poor performances of their portfolio companies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature and presents our testable hypothesis. In Section 3 we discuss in details the construction of our sample. The results of the empirical analysis are discussed in Section 4. The last Section concludes.
Literature review and hypothesis development
According to Diamond (1984) , banks are considered to facilitate the lender-borrower relationship because they are able to monitor firms and, consequently, mitigate the asymmetric information problems between lenders and borrowers. Hence, monitoring is acknowledged as a key function of banks. However, the literature also acknowledges that the effectiveness of the monitoring function and thus of the ability of banks to mitigate the asymmetric information problems between lenders and borrowers might depend on the number of bank relationships a firm establishes. It seems clear that multiple banking faces a trade-off between the benefits in term of risk diversification and the costs in term of duplication of effort and free-riding problem which can undermine the effectiveness of their monitoring (Diamond, 1984) . On the other hand, single banking exposes firms to the classical hold-up problem resulting from the informational monopoly power of the single bank (Sharpe, 1990 and Rajan, 1992) and to inefficient liquidation and constrained financing opportunities (Detragiache et al. (2000) , Gopalan et al. (2011) (Degryse and Ongena (2001) , Guiso and Minetti (2010) ). Khalil et al.
(2007) achieve similar conclusions to Carletti et al. (2007) in a more general set up that can be applied to financial contracts with multiple financiers. They develop of a model of multiple principals monitoring a common agent. Their focus is on the design of the contract as well as the level of monitoring as a result of the degree of coordination among the principals. They show that when coordination is difficult, which typically occurs when principals have conflicting objectives, free riding results in sub-optimally poor level of monitoring.
The beneficial effect of bank lending for IPO firms has been widely documented in the IPO literature. Slovin and Young (1990) provide evidence that the existence of bank debt and of credit lines lowers the expected initial return (underpricing) associated with IPOs. The rationale for this result lies in the certification role played by bank debt which becomes a signal to the market of the firm's value. Since, underpricing can be interpreted as a premium for ex-ante uncertainty about the firm market value (Ritter (1984) , Beatty and Ritter (1986) ), the certification role played by banks enables to reduce the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the firm thereby leading to less underpricing (James and Wier (1990) Otherwise stated, the previous hypothesis investigates whether the use of a relationship bank as IPO underwriter can mitigate the negative impact of multiple banking relationships on the IPO performance as measured by the underpricing.
Our previous hypothesis assumes that all banking relationships are equally important which justifies then to take the number of relationships as a proxy for the efficiency of monitoring.
However, while firms may borrow from more than one bank, these relationships might be asymmetric to the extent that firms might develop closer ties with only a few of them from which they will borrow more. This is indeed confirmed by Guiso and Minetti (2010) who, using US data, document that firms with multiple lending banks do borrow more from only some of them. For instance they find that firms with three lenders would typically borrow around 65% from one bank and they claim that similar patterns are documented in other countries as well. If this is the case, we can expect that the largest lenders have stronger incentives to monitor the borrowing firm.
Consequently, it would be more appropriate in our analysis to consider the "strength" of the lending relationship (or alternatively the concentration of borrowing) rather than the simple number of relationships. In order to do this, we test the following hypothesis:
H4: For firms with multiple banking relationships, underpricing is negatively related to the strength of the lending relationships.
We use several proxies for the strength of the lending relationships such as the average loan value and the loan concentration using a Herfindhal Index.
Data
We collect a sample of IPOs using the performances of firms the year before going public are collected using Jay Ritter's webpage and COMPUSTAT. The final sample contains a total of 1661 issues.
This sample is then matched with Dealscan which provides information about loan deals gathered mainly from SEC filings and contacts with the credit industry (Robert and Sufi, 2009 ).
For each company in our SDC sample, we search for information about loans and identify the financial institutions that provided loans to the company up to five years prior to the IPO date.
Loans in Dealscan are presented as deals or packages. Each deal may contain many facilities further split in different tranches. Each facility can be a sole lender loan or a syndicated loan. Since we are interested in the number of bank relationships for IPO firms, we base our analysis on the facility level in order to avoid information about potential relationships that can be ignored if we use the deal level analysis. For sole lender facilities, we use the name of the single lender as bank relation. For syndicated loans, we follow the procedure employed by Sufi (2007) to define the nature of bank relationship. Indeed, we first use the variable LEAD-ARRANGER-CREDIT to identify the lead arranger.
6 If the information is not available then we use the banks identified with "lead roles" in the variable LENDERS-ALL-LENDERS. 7 Since our argument is centered on the role of banks as monitors, we argue, in line with Bharat et al. (2011) , that the leading banks in each facility are those who play this monitoring role for syndicated loans.
We collect the following information about each facility: the identities of the financial institutions with leading roles in the loan, whether the loan is syndicated, the total face value of the loan, and, when available, the information about the share of each financial institution in the loan. Our final sample consists of 381 IPO firms having a total of 850 loans reported in Dealscan.
Based on the above information we construct the variable BANK capturing the number of bank relationships as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO firm has only one bank relation before going public and zero if more than one bank are found to be facilities' lead arrangers to the IPO firm. During our sample period, the mergers and acquisitions market for financial institutions was particularly active because of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act. We control for acquisitions by considering banks and their affiliated institutions as the same relationship for firms if the IPO date is after the merger date. Our second proxy for the number of bank relationships is NUMBER_BANKS defined as the actual number of bank relationships an IPO firm has at the IPO date. We additionally control for whether the loan is syndicated or not as it can be argued that syndicates are more prone to free riding problems in monitoring and hence exacerbate the negative impact on IPO underpricing. For this purpose we construct a proxy SYND: a dummy variable equal to one if at least one of the loans of the IPO firm was syndicated and 0 otherwise. Consistent with our argument, we can expect that low efficient monitoring would be associated with syndicated loans. Also, for each firm, we identify the names of lead underwriters and match them with the names of the lending banks. We define a dummy variable DID equal to 1 if one of the lead underwriter was also a relationship bank, and zero otherwise.
In order to test hypothesis 4, we define the following three proxies for bank relationships strength: IPO firms in our sample.
Before becoming publicly traded, firms are less transparent and information about their bank loans is not necessarily available on Dealscan. This may create several sampling biases we must control for. First, because Dealscan does not necessarily report all loans in particular for private firms, this may result in a misclassification of banks with multiple bank relations as single bank relation. This bias would play against our hypothesis as it reduces the difference between single and multiple bank relationships. Second, we find information about deals for only 23% of the whole IPO sample in our study period (381 over 1661 IPO firms). Compared to the whole sample (see Table 2 ), we can see that the average underpricing in our sample is 38.04% which is very close to the 38.30% average underpricing in the original SDC sample we crossed with Dealscan.
Compared to previous research on IPO, the average underpricing in our sample is slightly higher than the average underpricing reported in Jay Ritter's website. 8 We think that our subsample is not distorted in this respect. In Table 1 we define all the variables that will be used in our analysis.
[Insert Table 1 here] 4. Results with one bank, and the difference is statistically significant at 5%. This observation is in contradiction with our main hypothesis (H1). However, we note that firms with multiple bank relationships are larger, in terms of asset value, with larger IPO proceeds and larger revenues. This might explain some of the difference in underpricing since the IPO literature widely documents that offer size and firm size do affect IPO underpricing. Consistently with the intuition, multiple bank relationships firms exhibit larger debt than firms with one bank relationship and the difference, like for size proxies, are all statistically significant at 1% level. Furthermore, firms with single bank relationship tend to go public with less reputed underwriter and are on average younger. Some of these observations are consistent with the banking literature about bank relationships (Farinha and Santos (2002) , Detragiache et al. (2000) ). In terms of deals' characteristics, the number of loans and the total value of loans for firms with multiple bank relationships are significantly larger than for firms with single bank. For firms with multiple bank 8 The average underpricing for the same period reported by Ritter is 35.86% as can be derived from information on Ritter's website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2012Underpricing.pdf.
Univariate results
relationships, the average number of relations is 6.89 and more than 87% of loans are syndicated.
Overall, the univariate results suggest that there is fundamental differences between IPO firms with a single bank relationship and those with multiple bank relationships which we will need to take carefully into account in our analysis.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The determinants of the number of pre-IPO bank relationships
As discussed in the previous section, the descriptive statistics seems to suggest that firms with a single lending relationship are fundamentally different from firms with multiple banks. Hence, it seems relevant, as a first step in our analysis, to try and shed some light on what are the key factors that affect the likelihood of having one rather than multiple bank relationships. This will allow us to understand the determinants of the key variable in our analysis. We thus run a probit model relating the likelihood for an IPO firm of having a single bank relationship to some of its characteristics. Our analysis extends Gonzales and James (2007) who, on a sample of 673 IPO firms between 1996 and 2000, investigate the determinants of the likelihood of having a pre-IPO banking relationship. We run the following probit model:
Debt Characteristics is a vector of variables including information about firm's loan contracts. We consider leverage, the number of bank loans contracted by the firm and the total loan value. The vector Firm characteristics includes size, age, cash, revenue, whether the firm is in the technology sector, and whether it is financed by a VC. The results of the probit, reported in Table 3 , are in line with the univariate results and confirm that the age of the firm does not affect the likelihood of having a single bank relationship. Furthermore, the size of the firm (measured by total assets), the level of indebtedness (measured by the debt to assets ratio), and the ratio of total revenue to total assets do not affect the likelihood for firms to be single bank relationship. This may be explained by the fact that all these ratios do not necessarily reflect the size of the characteristics of the firm at the time of deciding the structure of bank relationships. Also, the likelihood of a single bank relationship appears to be independent of whether the company is a technology company or VC backed. These findings are in line with Detriagiache et al. (2000) who find that the age of firms and their ownership structure do not affect the likelihood of having single bank relationship.
However, firms with a larger ratio of cash to assets (which may be a proxy for the quality of the IPO firm as a borrower) are more likely to have multiple bank relationship. Also, the total value of loans and the number of loans affect significantly the likelihood of firms to be single bank relationship. These results are consistent with Farinha and Santos (2002) who show that firms switching from single to multiple banks are concerned by the hold-up costs related to single bank relationship and to the willingness of banks to diversify their exposition to firm's risk when loan values (and number) are larger.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Multivariate regression results
In this section, we examine the relationship between the structure of bank relationships and the IPO underpricing for our sample of 381 IPOs in the US market between January 1998 and June 2008. To test our hypothesis H1, we consider the following regression:
where Underpricing is the first day return, The IPO Characteristics, is a vector containing the IPO proceeds (relative to the total assets) which are expected to have a positive correlation with IPO underpricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) , the Bubble period as being characterized by unusually high level of underpricing, the reputation of the underwriter and whether the firm is backed by a venture capitalist (VC). The results of our OLS regression are reported in Table 4 .
Model 1 (first column) represents our basic model. The results show that having one bank relationship does significantly lower IPO underpricing: The coefficient on Bank is negative, and statistically and economically significant. We also find that firms with higher Cash to Total Assets ratios have significantly higher underpricing while more leveraged firms are less underpriced. As expected, we find that smaller offerings are more underpriced than larger ones. In Model 2, we control for the Internet bubble period and find that, as expected, IPOs exhibit higher underpricing during this period. include all firm and IPO characteristics, and confirm that the coefficient on Bank is negative and statistically significant (βBank = -0.1618). In other words, the underpricing for firms with one banking relationship is about 16% lower than the underpricing of firms with multiple banking relationships.
In model 8, we replace the dummy Bank with the actual number of bank relationships, for a given IPO firm, log(1+Banks), 9 in order to check whether the negative impact on the underpricing is increasing in the number of banking relationships (H2). The results show that the coefficient of our variable of interest while of the expected sign is not statistically significant indicating a discrete 9 We find similar results when we use number of bank relationships as an explanatory variable.
relationship between the number of banking relationships and IPO underpricing. Results are robust to testing for the non-linearity of the number of banking relationship by using a square term rather than the logarithmic transformation. Generally, our results suggest that the crucial factor is having a single banking relationship. This result is consistent with the monitoring loss of efficiency associated with multiple banking. Indeed, as suggested by Carletti et al. (2007) , the free riding problem and the coordination problems increase with the number of bank relationships. However, the marginal loss of monitoring efficiency is decreasing with the number of bank relationships.
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Our empirical results suggest that underpricing is affected only by the largest marginal loss of efficiency captured by the difference between single and multiple bank relationships.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The strength of the lending relationship
From the above analysis, we find that IPO firms with a single bank relationship are less underpriced than firms with multiple bank relationships. We argue that this occurs because multiple banks are less efficient/effective in monitoring firms, which results in a weaker certification role of multiple lenders that ultimately translates in more underpricing.
In the previous analysis our variable of interest does not distinguish whether the lending banks 
The variable DID is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has used one of its relationship bank as underwriter in the IPO and 0 otherwise. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 show that approximately 42% of firms with multiple bank relationships do use one of their lending banks as acting underwriters, whereas this is far less common among firms with a single bank relationship (only 8%). To capture the moderation effect of such a decision we interact the dummy DID with the variable (1-BANK). We choose to look at (1-BANK) as the effect of going public with a relationship bank is likely to be more beneficial, if at all, for firms with multiple banking relationships. Results are reported in Table 5 (Column 2). The variable (1-Bank) has as expected a positive coefficient estimate, which is also strongly statistically significant whereas the coefficient estimate of the interaction term is of the expected sign but statistically not significant. The first two measures capture the extent to which a bank is involved in the firm's financing.
We conjecture that a higher average number of bank loans per bank or/and a higher average loan value per bank would increase the incentive for a bank to monitor the firm thereby reducing the negative spillover of having multiple banks. In the regression, we present the results using the natural logarithm of the average loan value. The Herfindhal Index measures whether firm loans are more or less concentrated among few banks. The index would be equal to 1 if loans are highly concentrated (i.e. are contracted by a single bank) and lower than one if they are dispersed among many different lenders. Hence, it is a good measure of the strength of the banking relationship. It is important here to note that we are able to calculate the H-index for only 258 firms in our sample.
The results of this last test are reported in columns 3-5 of Table 5 . We note that the average number of loans as well as the H-index have both the expected sign, negative, but appear to be statistically 11 Schenone (2004) distinguishes between lending bank relationships that could take firms public and those that could not because they are not active in the underwriting market. In the context of our sample, we cannot employ such a classification because among the remaining 48% of firms with multiple banking that do not choose any of their relationship banks as their underwriter, the majority, approximatively 43%, have lending banks that are not active in the underwriting market. Hence results will be qualitatively similar to the ones we present here. The difference with respect to the sample used by Schenone (2004) may be due to different time frame covered in the analysis. Indeed, while our sample extends between 1998 and 2008, Schenone's sample only covers the first two years after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 1998-2000. It seems clear that after that commercial banks have become more active in the underwriting market.
insignificant. These results suggest that, at least from outside investors' perspective, what is important is mainly the structure of lending relationships (captured in our model by the variable BANK) rather than the strength of these relationships as measured by the average number of loans per bank or the concentration of loans among banks.
However, contrary to our intuition, Table 5 (Column 3) reports that the average loan value has a strongly statistically significant positive coefficient estimate. A possible explanation for this might be the high correlation existing between the average loan value and total assets (Pearson correlation equal to 0.7180) which suggests that the average loan value is not an adequate proxy for the strength of the lending relationship.
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[Insert Table 5 here]
Robustness Tests: The Endogeneity of the Bank Dummy
Results from Table 4 suggest that one bank relationship has a negative and significant effect on underpricing. This negative relation could be explained by the fact that banking relationships could indeed contain private information about underpricing not reflected in the other explanatory variables considered in our model. However, this observed negative relation could also be driven by the endogeneity of our Bank variable. Results from Tables 2 and 3 show that firms with multiple banking relationships are larger, have more debt, and less likely to be VC backed than firms with one bank relationship. These factors also affect the IPO underpricing. Thus, the effect of banking relationships on underpricing could reflect the endogenous nature of our variable Bank rather than any private information about underpricing it might contain. In order to address this problem we 12 It should be noticed that this result might also be affected by whether the loan is secured or not. Everything else equal in fact, monitoring incentives would be lower the higher the value of collateral securing the bank's outstanding loans. Unfortunately our dataset does not provide this kind of information for us to test such hypothesis. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue.
use the same Two-Stage Estimate approach designed and implemented by Aggarwal et al (2002) .
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In the first stage, Bank is regressed on a vector of regressors that include also but not only those used in the OLS estimate. As an instrument we use the number of deals for IPO firms. From Table   3 , we know that the number of loans strongly affect the likelihood of having one rather than many banking relationships. Furthermore, from the results presented in Table 5 , the average number of deals is not correlated with underpricing. We run a similar regression to Model 4 in Table 5 by using the natural logarithm of the number of deals before the IPO and the results show that this variable does not significantly affect underpricing. We argue that the number of deals is not necessarily observable by investors during the IPO period since some of these deals do not necessarily appear in the IPO firm prospectus since we gather data up to five years before the IPO date. This suggests that the number of deals is a good candidate to be the instrument in our regression. In the first equation we run Equation (1) 
Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of the number of banking relationships on IPO underpricing.
While the IPO literature widely document the beneficial role of bank lending and more generally of credit relationships on reducing ex-ante uncertainty for IPO firms (Slovin and Young, 1990; James and Wier, 1990, Schenone, 2004) , no paper has yet investigated whether this beneficial impact is affected and, if so to what extent, by the exact number of banking relationships. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap.
Our results suggest that IPO firms that go public with more than one banking relationships exhibit larger underpricing than those that go public with more than one banking relationships and that this remains true even after correcting for the potential endogeneity of our variable of interest.
We interpret our results by linking them to the literature on multiple banking. Specifically, our findings provide some support to the theoretical arguments that show that multiple banking suffers from internal agency conflicts that might lead to sub-optimal levels of monitoring (Carletti et al., 2007; Khalil et al. 2007 ). This in turn would result in a weaker certification role of multiple banking relationships as opposite to single banking relationships and hence in a larger underpricing as we document in this paper. We also find that the effect of multiple banking relationships on IPO underpricing is binary and does not increase with the number of bank relationships. Thus, the key factor seems to be having one banking relationships. Finally, we find that the strength of the banking relationship does not play a significant role in affecting IPO performances 
Nasdaq
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 for Nasdaq IPOs, 0 otherwise.
Price Revision
The difference between the offer price and the mid-range price divided by the mid-range price multiplied by 100.
Underpricing
The first day return i.e. (First Day Closing Price -Offering Price) / First Day Closing Price.
Reputation
A measure of the reputation of the lead underwriter of the IPO using the ranking of Loughran and Ritter (2004) . The underwriter's reputation is ranked on a scale of 1 to 9. The variable Reputation is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for underwriters ranked at least 8, 0 otherwise.
Reputation2
A dummy variable based on The variable Reputation. If Reputation is higher than 8, then Reputation2 is equal to 1, 0 otherwise. BANK A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has only one banking relationship before its IPO, 0 in case of multiple banking relationships. AVERAGE_NUMBER_LOANS The number of loans contracted by the IPO firm five years before the IPO date divided by the number of bank relationships.
NUMBER_BANKS
The number of bank relationships having leading roles in the different loans contracted by the IPO firm.
SYND
A dummy variable equal to 1 if we have the firm contracted at least one syndicated loan and 0 otherwise.
AVERAGE_LOAN_VALUE
The total value of loans divided by the number of bank relationships.
HERFINDAHL
The sum of Herfindahl indices for different loans divided by the number of loans. For each loan, the Herfindahl index is the sum of squared proportions lent by different banks participating in the loan.
DID
A dummy variable equal to one if the IPO underwriter is one of the lending bank relationships, 0 otherwise. We only consider loans of $100,000 and above. The control variables used are: Ln(Total Assets) which denotes the log of firm i's total assets the year before the IPO date (in millions of dollars); Total Debt to Total Assets is the debt-to-assets ratio (at the IPO year); Cash to Total Assets is the cash-to-assets ratio (at the IPO year); Ln(1+age) is the natural log of 1 plus the years since the firm's founding date as of the IPO; Total Proceeds to Total Assets total proceeds-to-total assets ratio (at the IPO year). The Bubble dummy takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if the IPO occurred during 1999-2000. VC is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm is VC backed or not. Reputation dummy takes a value of one if the lead underwriter has a ranking according to Carter and Manaster (1990) Technology is a dummy variable that takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if the firm is in the technology business. Model 1 tests the impact of syndicated loans on underpricing by using the variable SYND that is equal to 1 if at least one of the loans is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Model 2 tests the marginal impact on underpricing for firms going public with one of lending relationships. Did is equal to 1 if the firm's lead IPO underwriter is a bank relationship. We consider the variable (1-BANK) that is equal to 1 for firms with multiple banks and 0 otherwise. . Models 3, 4 and 5 test the impact on underpricing of other measures of bank relationship strength: Average Loan Value, Average number of Loans and Herfindahl index, respectively. We use the natural logarithm of Average Loan Value (in millions) which is the total value of loans divided by the number of relationships. Average number of Loans is the total number of Loans divided by the number of relationships. HERFINDAHL is the average Herfindahl index for the different loans. Data needed to calculate Herfindahl index is available only for only 258 firms in our sample. We consider a sample of 381 IPOs in the US market between January 1998 and June 2008. Our sample does not include depository shares, spin-offs, real estate investment trusts (REITs), reverse leveraged buyouts, unit offers, banks, savings and loans, closed-end funds, IPOs with offer prices less than five dollars and IPOs that have missing observations for any of the listed variables. We only consider loans of $100,000 and above. In equation (1), we regress BANK (which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has one banking relationship before its IPO, 0 otherwise (in case of multiple banking relationships)) on the following control variables : Ln(Total Assets) which denotes the log of firm i's total assets the year before the IPO date (in millions of dollars). ; Total Debt to Total Assets is the debt-to-assets ratio (at the IPO year); Cash to Total Assets is the cash-to-assets ratio (at the IPO year); Ln(1+age) is the natural log of 1 plus the years since the firm's founding date as of the IPO; Ln(1+number of deals before IPO) is the natural log of 1 plus the number of deals before IPO; Total Proceeds to Total Assets is the total proceeds-to-total assets ratio (at the IPO year). The Bubble dummy takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if the IPO occurred during 1999-2000. Price Revision = [(Offer Price − Mean Filing Price) /Mean Filing Price]* 100; Technology is a dummy variable that takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if the firm is in the technology business. In equation (2), we regress Underpricing (or initial return) on the same set of control variables of equation (1).We also add the Fitted Bank variable (from estimation (1) 40.94% * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
